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MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR REQUIRING
UNFIT POLICE OFFICERS TO CARRY GUNS
I. Introduction
The stress of police work' is evidenced by high rates of suicide,
marital problems, alcoholism, heart disease, and psychosomatic illnesses. 2 Combined with the requirement that police officers carry
guns while off-duty, 3 the emotional stress of police work creates the
risk that a police officer will use his gun wrongfully to injure himself
or another party. 4 This risk, however, is believed to be outweighed by
the advantages of having a police officer on twenty-four hour duty. 5

1. Police work is considered one of the most stressful occupations. See Farmer &
Monahan, The Prevention Modelfor Stress Reduction: A Concept Paper, 8 J. POLICE
Sci. & ADMIN. 54 (1980); Kroes, Margolis, & Hurrell, Job Stress in Policemen, 2 J.
POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. (1974).
2. Farmer & Monahao, supra note 1, at 55; Kroes, Margolis & Hurrell, supra
note 1, at 145. This stress is attributed to both the nature of the police work and the
nature of the police organization. Farmer & Monahan, supra note 1, at 54. Police
officers deal with the worst that society has to offer on a routine basis. The work is a
combination of long stretches of boredom which may be punctuated by moments of
terror. The work also is completely unpredictable. Record at A441, Bonsignore v.
City of New York, 683 F.2d. 635 (2d Cir. 1982).
One study has indicated the following sources of stress for the police officer:
department administration, the courts, community relations, equipment, line of
duty crisis situations, changing shift routines and isolation, boredom, and inactivity.
Farmer & Monahan, supra note 1, at 55. See also Reiser, Some Organizational
Stresses on Policemen, 2 J. POLICE Sci. & ADMIN. 156 (1974). The police department
is said to represent a family with a strict hierarchical organization. This organization
creates a pecking order which operates on principles of seniority and rank, and
affects communication, morale and discipline. Authoritarian management approaches predominate in the traditional police organization, with relatively little
attention given to individual problems or human factors. Other stress factors within
the police organization include the internal discipline structure and peer group
influence. Id.
3. See note 210 infra for New York City's regulation. Few police departments
have restricted the bearing of weapons by officers when not on active duty while
most departments encourage the practice. Safer, Deadly Weapons in the Hands of
Police Officers, On Duty and Off Duty, 49 J. URB. L. 565, 574 (1971). See note 50
infra.
4. "The off duty officer, armed in a manner that would be unlawful if he were
a civilian, may be emboldened to respond in a violent manner to frustrations which
at times beset most humans." Safer, supra note 3, at 576. Because a police officer is
trained to shoot a weapon, it is more likely that he will use that weapon as a means to
injure someone. In a recent case, an expert witness testified that there is a direct
correlation between possession of handguns and the occurrence of deadly violence in
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The liability of municipalities for injuries resulting from unfit officers' use of firearms is increasing. The Second Circuit, in Bonsignore
v. City of New York, ' recently adopted an expanded theory of liability, imposing a duty upon municipalities 7 to adopt reasonable procedures to identify police officers who are unfit to carry a firearm at all
times.8 A city may now be liable for damages" for the harmful acts of
a police officer caused by the city's failure to adopt reasonable screening and monitoring programs for its armed officers. 10 Requiring a

police families. Moreover, a person with a severe depressive disorder is more likely to
commit an act of homicide against his or her spouse if that person possesses firearms.
Record at A611-12, Bonsignore. "[The gun is] itself an impersonalized expression of
aggression. It's an instrument that could deliver danger very rapidly. It does not
require a hell of a lot of forethought. One could act off the impulse and discharge it
rather quickly using the instrument. There is no basis for the perpetrator to come into
physical contact with his potential victim." Record at A626, Bonsignore. Almost
100 % of the suicides among police officers in New York City are committed with a
gun, whereas in the general population of men only 63% commit suicide with guns.
Record at A453, Bonsignore.
5. Safer, supra note 3, at 574-79. It has been suggested that the use of firearms
by policemen be restricted, as is true in England, to only those who absolutely need
to use weapons in the course of their duties. This point of view has not gained wide
acceptance in this country. Id. at 574. However, presidential commissions have
recommended "the development of non-lethal but speedy and efficient weapons" to
replace the handguns carried by police officers. Id. at 576.
6. 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1982). See notes 130-76 injra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the case.
7. The New York City Police Department puts great weight on Judge Sofaer's
statement at 521 F. Supp. 394, 402 n.3, that it would be improper to permit the
Bonsignore decision to serve as a basis for collateral estoppel against the city in future
lawsuits. Interview with Assistant Commissioner Rosemary Carroll, New York City
Police Department, in New York City (March 2, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Carroll
Interview]. The Bonsignore court noted that the city "inexplicably offered virtually
no defense of its programs" and that the city should be free to relitigate against other
plaintiffs the adequacy of its psychological detection and treatment programs. 521 F.
Supp. at 402 & n.3. The city therefore believes that it was not really negligent in
adopting the programs and is confident that, had it been given the chance to defend
the programs, the city would have been successful. Carroll Interview, supra; Interview with Sgts. Gerard W. Kelly and David W. Nadel, New York City Police
Department, in New York City (March 4, 1983). Since 1976, the city has expanded
and improved its program. See notes 192-210 infra and accompanying text. It is yet
to be seen whether the city can successfully defend the programs that were in effect in
1976 and those in existence today. Nevertheless, other municipalities are potentially
liable on the same issue.
9. The number of liability suits against police departments has increased greatly
in the last 15 years. Between 1967 and 1971, liability suits increased by 446%. As a
result, liability insurance for police has become more difficult to procure. Large
cities, including New York, have always been uninsurable. Krajick, The Liability
Crisis: Who Will Insure the Police?, POLICE MAC. 8, 8-9 (March 1978).
10. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638.
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police officer to be armed without adequate prior screening by the
city, said the court, poses a risk of harm to the officer, other policemen and members of the public."
Traditionally, municipalities were liable to victims of police shootings under the theories of respondeat superior, 12 negligent hiring or
retention, 3 negligent training, 14 or under 42 U.S.C. §1983.'1 Municipal liability was precluded, however, if the victim was shot by a
police officer: (1) acting outside the scope of his duty; (2) acting in
abuse of the privilege of carrying a gun; or (3) while the officer was
committing a crime.' 6 In Bonsignore, however, the jury found that
the police officer's intentional assault was not such an intervening act
and the Second Circuit affirmed.' 7 The court held that the city, by
requiring its officers to carry guns at all times, could have reasonably
anticipated that the failure to identify those officers who may be unfit
for that responsibility would result in injury from an unfit officer's use
of a gun.' 8 Bonsignore's expansion of liability indicates the need for
municipalities to develop screening and monitoring procedures which
will survive judicial scrutiny.
This Note will examine liability for injuries resulting from a municipality's failure to monitor the fitness of police officers who are required to carry guns. The Note will review the development of municipal liability for police shootings and will examine various theories
under which victims have recovered damages from municipalities.
Next, Bonsignore v. City of New York will be analyzed in terms of its
expansion of the negligence theory of municipal liability and its warning to municipalities to establish reasonable screening and monitoring
programs to detect unfit policemen. Finally, procedures will be recommended for detecting unfit police officers so that they may be
identified and evaluated before harmful or fatal incidents occur.

II. An Overview of Municipal Liability
The principle of sovereign immunity is rooted deeply in the common law. ' 9 Municipal corporations, created by a sovereign, tradition11. Id.
12. See notes 42-63 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 67-79 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 80-95 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 96-129 infra and accompanying text.
16. See notes 52-61, 93-94 & 116-20 infra and accompanying text.
17. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638. See notes 160-63 infra and accompanying text.
18. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638.
19. The principle appears to have developed from the concept "the king can do
no wrong." See Fox, The King Must Do No Wrong: A Critiqueof the CurrentStatus
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ally enjoyed the same immunity from tort liability as the sovereign
itself. Immunity is predicated on the theory that the sovereign may
not be sued without its consent, and that an agency of the sovereign is
likewise immune. 20 Subsequently, a majority of the states recognized a
distinction between governmental and proprietary functions in connection with the immunity of municipal corporations. This distinction
stems from the dual role of a municipality. A municipality, as a
subdivision of the state, is charged with the performance of certain
activities which are usually the responsibility of a sovereign. A municipality also has a corporate existence in which it performs functions
similar to those of private corporations. 2 1 Under this dichotomy, functions which can be performed adequately only by the government and
which are truly governmental in nature are immune from tort liability.2 2 In contrast, proprietary functions, which include services that
could be provided by a private corporation, expose the municipality to
liability for its negligence in the same manner as a private corpora23
tion.
The operation of a police department, a matter of paramount
public interest and benefit, traditionally has been recognized as a

of Sovereign and Official Immunity, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 177, 193 (1979). The earliest
decision establishing that an individual could not maintain an action against a
political subdivision of the state is generally considered to be the English case, Russell
v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788) (better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience).
20. W. PROSSEn, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971); 18 MCQUILLIN, THE
LAW OF MUNICIPAL COm'ORATIONS § 53.02 (rev. 3d ed. & Supp. 1982); see also 57

AM. JuR. 2D Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 28 (1971 & Supp. 1982).
21. W. PROSSEn, supra note 20, § 131; 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, §§ 53.02,
53.22a-53.59; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 29-6, at 1619 (1956).

See also 57 AM. JuR. 2 n, supra note 20, § 27. In Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531
(1842), New York first declared the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions. At first, the governmental-proprietary distinction generally was accepted in almost every jurisdiction, but it later became subject to heavy criticism. See
18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.02; Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34
YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Casner & Fuller, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54
HARv. L. REV. 437 (1941); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L.
REV. 751 (1956); see also 57 AM. JuR. 2o, supra note 20, § 30.

22. W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 131, at 979. Examples of governmental functions include: the duty to make and enforce appropriate laws and regulations; the
exercise of legislative or judicial discretion; the imprisonment of criminals; the maintenance and operation of public schools; and the protection of public health. Id. §
131, at 979-80.
23. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.02, at 105. Examples of proprietary
functions include such duties as supplying water, gas, or electricity to the public,
operating an airport, and operating a municipal garage for profit. W. PROSSER, supra
note 20, § 131, at 981.
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purely governmental activity. 24 Accordingly, municipalities generally
were held immune from tort liability arising from police law enforcement activity.2 5
The governmental-proprietary distinction, established by the judiciary to mitigate the harshness of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, 26 was an artifical distinction which led to great confusion and
irreconcilable conflict.2 7 This controversy fueled the already widespread criticism of the governmental immunity doctrine 28 and led to
29
its abrogation by the legislatures and the courts.

24. W. PRossma, supra note 20, § 131, at 979; 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, §
53.22(c).
25. Id. See also Dakin, Municipal Immunity in Police Torts, 16 CLEV. MAR. L.
REV. 448 (1967); Mathes & Jones, Towards a "Scope of Official Duty" hnmunity for
Police Officers in Damage Actions, 53 GEO. L.J. 889 (1965). Courts have found the
following policies persuasive:
(1) public entities should not be stifled or impeded by the burden or the
threat of liability in carrying out their law enforcement duties;
(2) public funds should not be diverted to the liquidation of private damages;
(3) police-type entities rarely have funds available to pay damages;
(4) fraud and excessive litigation would ensue if such entities were made
liable, and this would result in unbearable cost to the public;
(5) the "ancient notion" expressed in the early cases, that it is better for an
individual to suffer than for the public to be inconvenienced; and
(6) the "legalistic" supposition that respondeatsuperior does not apply to
municipal or other governmental entities.
Mathes & Jones, supra, at 829-93. Notwithstanding this governmental immunity, a
police officer may be liable personally for the torts he commits during the performance of his duties. Gilday v. Hauchwit, 48 N.J. 557, 226 A.2d 834 (1967); Benally v.
Robinson, 14 Utah 2d 6, 376 P.2d 388 (1962); Down v. Swann, 111 Md. 53, 73 A.
653 (1909). See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 50-k (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983), which
provides for indemnification of city employees in civil actions.
26, 18 McQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.02, at 104.
27. Id. at 105-06. "A comparative study of the cases in the forty-eight States will
disclose an irreconcilable conflict. More than that, the decisions in each of the States
are disharmonious and disclose the inevitable chaos when courts try to apply a rule of
law that is inherently unsound." Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65
(1955) (United States liable under Federal Tort Claims Act for damages caused by
negligence of Coast Guard in maintaining lighthouse).
28. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.02, at 104-05. The doctrine was "never
completely accepted by the courts, its underlying principle being deemed contrary to
the basic concept of the law of torts that liability follows negligence, as well as
foreign to the spirit of the constitutional guarantee that every person is entitled to a
legal remedy for injuries he may receive." Id. at 104.
29. Id. at 106-08. See also F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 21, § 29.1 n.2
commentary (Supp. 1968); 57 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 20, §§ 60-61, 65-68; Borchard,
State and Municipal Liability in Tort-ProposedStatutory Reform, 20 A.B.A.J. 747
(1934); Vanlandingham, Local Governmental Immunity Re-examined, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV.

237 (1966).
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For example, in 1920, the New York State Legislature abolished
governmental immunity by enacting legislation waiving the state's
immunity from liability and consenting to have its liability determined by the rules of law applicable to individuals or private corporations.30 The full effect of this waiver was unclear until 1945 when the
New York Court of Appeals decided Bernardine v. City of New
York. 3 ' In Bernardine, the plaintiff sued the City of New York to
recover damages for personal injuries caused by a runaway police
horse. 32 The court declared that the waiver of immunity "naturally"
extended to municipal corporations, counties, towns, and all other
political subdivisions of the state.3 3 New York City was held liable for
the policeman's negligent act, committed in the course of his duties.3 4
As the states abolished immunity and no longer adhered to the
governmental-proprietary distinction, the courts began to find municipalities liable for torts committed by police officers, usually under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. 35 The first state appellate court decision to abrogate the rule of municipal immunity was handed down in
1957 by the Florida Supreme Court.36 In Hargrovev. Town of Cocoa

-

30. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). "In other words, in each case the test
now is whether an individual or private corporation, assuming that he or it were
obligated to discharge the governmental duty involved, would be liable to the injured
person for a breach of that duty." Runkel v. City of New York, 282 A.D. 173, 178,
123 N.Y.S.2d 485, 490 (2d Dep't 1953)(emphasis omitted).
31. 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
32. Id. at 364, 62 N.E.2d at 604-05.
33. Id. at 365, 62 N.E.2d at 605. The court reasoned:
On the waiver by the State of its own sovereign dispensation, that extension naturally was at an end and thus we were brought all the way round
to a point where the civil divisions of the State are answerable equally
with individuals and private corporations for wrongs of officers and employees, even if no separate statute sanctions that enlarged liability in a
given instance.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Annot., 161 A.L.R. 367; 57 AM. JuR. 2D, supra note
20, § 61.
34. Bernardine, 294 N.Y. at 367, 62 N.E.2d at 606.
35. See notes 42-63 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of respondeat
superior. See also 18 McQuILLIN, supra note 20, §§ 53.79, 53.79c, 53.79d; Greenstone, Liability of Police Officers for Misuse of Their Weapons, 16 CLEV. MAR. L.
REv. 397 (1967); Littlejohn, Civil Liability and the Police Officer: The Need for New
Deterrents to PoliceMisconduct, 58 U. DET. J. UrB. L. 365 (1981); SHAPO, Municipal
Liability for Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand of American Legal History, 17 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 475 (1963).
36. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.02, at 106; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
supra note 21, § 29.1 n.2 commentary at 277 (Supp. 1968).
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Beach,3 7 the court held that a municipal corporation may be liable for
the torts committed by a police officer acting within the scope of his
employment. 38 The court held that an injured party is entitled to
redress from the municipality when the injury is proximately caused
by the negligence of the police officer. 39 Six years later, municipal
by police officers
liability was extended to intentional torts committed
40
performing their law enforcement duties.
III. Theories of Recovery Against a Municipality
Presently, municipal immunity exists in only a minority of jurisdictions. 41 Most courts apply several theories to find municipalities liable
for their own torts as well as for the torts committed by police officers.
A. State Law Tort Claims
1. Respondeat Superior
The doctrine of respondeat superior provides that a master is liable
for the torts of his servant committed in the course of the servant's
employment. 42 As applied to police shooting cases, the doctrine im-

37. 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1957) (en bane). Hargrove involved an action by
a widow against the city for the alleged wrongful death of her husband who died of
smoke suffocation after being jailed while in a helpless state of intoxication and left
unattended. Id. at 131.
38. Id. at 133-34.
39. Id.
40. Simpson v. City of Miami, 155 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1963) (city liable for its police
officers' intentional tort of assault and battery).
41. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.02; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note
21, § 29.1 n.2 commentary (Supp. 1968). See also Note, Municipal Immunity Developments since Jackson v. Florence, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 115 (1981) (because the
doctrine of municipal liability was judicially created, courts have the power to
abolish it; however, legislatures have the power, within constitutional restraints, to
provide limitations on liability where they deem necessary).
42. W. PRossER, supra note 20, § 69, at 458. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY, §§ 219, 243 (1958); Brill, The Liability of an Employer for the Wilful Torts
of his Servants, 45 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1 (1968). The justification for the doctrine of
respondeat superior is a "deliberate allocation of risk" and the losses caused by the
torts of the employee
are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise
which will, on the basis of all past experience, involve harm to others
through the torts of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he,
rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because
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poses vicarious liability upon a showing that the master-servant relationship existed, and that the tortious act was committed while the
officer was acting within the scope of his duties. 43 Liability "extends to
any and all tortious conduct" of the police officer that is within the
44
scope of his employment.
Whether a police officer was in fact acting within the scope of his
employment is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. 45 For example, a city may be held liable for a negligent shooting by a police
officer which takes place during the interrogation of suspects since the
interrogation is within the officer's employment. 46 Moreover, a municipality may be liable even for an intentional shooting of an officer
47
which is found to be within the scope of his police duties.
Given the nature of police work, an officer retains his employee
status when his tour of active duty ends. 48 As one court stated, an

he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices,
rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to
the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an
employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be
careful in the selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to
take every precaution to see that the enterprise is conducted safely.
W. PnossER, supra note 20, § 69, at 459.
43. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, §§ 53.65, 53.79. See, e.g., McAndrew v.
Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960) (municipality may be liable for injury
resulting from the active wrongdoing of a police officer who either intentionally shot
the plaintiff or negligently fired his revolver as a warning). In minority jurisdictions,
where municipal governmental immunity has not been abrogated and the governmental-proprietary distinction is still in use, the tort of the officer would have to be
committed while exercising a ministerial or proprietary function. 18 McQuILLIN,
supra note 20, § 53.65. See also Reeves v. City of Jackson, 608 F.2d 644 (5th Cir.
1979) (city not liable for the torts of its police officers committed while engaged in
matters pertaining to the police powers of the city).
44. W. PRossER, supra note 20, § 70 at 460.
45. Fitzgerald v. McCrutcheon, 270 Pa. Super. 102, 106, 410 A.2d 1270, 1271
(1980) (citation omitted); Garner v. Saunders, 281 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 1973); Kull
v. City of New York, 40 A.D.2d 829, 830, 337 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (2d Dep't), rev'd on
dissenting opinion, 32 N.Y.2d 951, 300 N.E.2d 736, 347 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1973); Burns
v. City of New York, 6 A.D.2d 30, 33, 174 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196 (1st Dep't 1958).
46. Wagstaff v. City of Maplewood, 615 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. App. 1981) (city liable
for wrongful death of decedent who was shot by police officer during an interrogation).
47. McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 189, 162 A.2d 820, 829 (1960) (city
may be liable for injuries resulting from bullet fired by police officer, allegedly in
self-defense).
48. Fyfe, Always Prepared:Police Off-Duty Guns, 452 ANNALS 72 (Nov. 1980).
See Burns v. City of New York, 6 A.D.2d 30, 174 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1958) (offduty officer has the authority to arrest narcotics suspect and city may be liable for
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officer may be required to perform in his official capacity even while
technically off-duty. 4 To further this end, police officers are either
required or permitted to carry a gun at all times.50 Therefore, a
patrolman's use of his weapon may be within the scope of his employment if his actions are in furtherance of his employer's interests 1
By contrast, a municipality, as an employer, may not be liable
under respondeat superior where the police officer is not performing
an act or function beneficial to the city's interest or where the officer is
"clearly acting in furtherance of his personal interest";52 that is, when

officer's torts committed during the arrest); Garner v. Saunders, 281 So. 2d 392 (Fla.
1973) (by virtue of city regulations requiring police officers to be on duty at all times
and to possess a gun at all times, city may be liable for torts committed by off-duty
police officer).
49. Collins v. City of New York, 11 Misc. 2d 76, 78, 171 N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1958), aff'd mem., 8 A.D.2d 613, 185 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 822, 164 N.E.2d 719, 196 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1959); see also Burns v. City
of New York, 6 A.D.2d 30, 33, 174 N.Y.S.2d 192, 196 (1st Dep't 1958); Garner v.
Saunders, 281 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 1973). "In many jurisdictions, off-duty police
may be disciplined or prosecuted for failing to respond in an 'appropriate' manner to
situations threatening to life, property, or order." Fyfe, supra, note 48, at 73.
50. Kull v. City of New York, 40 A.D.2d 829, 337 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (2d Dep't),
rev'd on dissenting opinion, 32 N.Y.2d 951, 300 N.E.2d 736, 347 N.Y.S.2d 205
(1973); Collins v. City of New York, 11 Misc. 2d 76, 78, 171 N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1958), aff'd mem., 8 A.D.2d 613, 185 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 822, 164 N.E.2d 719, 196 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1959); Burns v. City of New
York, 6 A.D.2d 30, 33, 174 N.Y.S.2d 196-97 (1st Dep't 1958); Garner v. Saunders,
281 So.2d 392, 393 (Fla. 1973).
American police almost everywhere are expected to be armed and ready
for action. As a 1978 survey of 49 major police departments found, 25
departments-51 per cent-reported permitting officers to carry off-duty
guns, and 24-49 percent-reported requiring that officers be armed off
duty. None required officers to leave their guns at police stations at the
completion of the working day.
Fyfe, supra note 48, at 73.
51. King v. City of Clinton, 343 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. App. 1961) (gun accidently
discharged when police officer tripped on his way to report to duty); Collins v. City
of New York, 11 Misc. 2d 76, 171 N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), aff'd
mem., 8 A.D. 2d 613, 185 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 7 N.Y. 2d 822, 164 N.E.2d
719, 196 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1959) (police officer accidently dropped off-duty revolver
while on his way to report for duty); Rives v. Bolling, 180 Va. 124, 21 S.E.2d 775
(1942) (negligent cleaning of loaded gun while off-duty is within employ). See also
MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.80b; 57 AM. JuR. 2D, supra note 20, § 254; Greenstone, Liability of Police Officers for Misuse of Their Weapons, 16 CLEv.-MAR. L.
REV. 397 (1967).
52. Collins v. City of New York, 11 Misc. 2d 76, 79, 171 N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1958); aff'd mem., 8 A.D.2d 613, 185 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 822, 164 l.E.2d 719, 196 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1959). See also City of Green
Cove Springs v. Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197, 203 (5th Cir. 1965).
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he is acting outside the scope of his employment. 53 These exceptions
apply whether or not the officer is on- or off-duty and whether or not
54
the act was negligent or intentional.
A police officer is said to have departed from the scope of his
employment when his conduct is considered "too outrageous" to be in
furtherance of the city's interests. 55 Actions which have been deemed
outside the scope of employment include: a reckless and irresponsible
shooting resulting from a police officer's intoxicated and confused
condition; 56 a shooting occurring in connection with an unauthorized
arrest; 57 a shooting resulting from a police officer's independent
actions which provoked a disturbance; 58 and a killing motivated solely
by personal reasons. 5 Although an intentional shooting committed

53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ACENCY § 228 (1964), defines conduct within the
scope of employment as follows:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially
within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in
part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used
by the servant against another, the use of the force is not unexpectable by
the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is
different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or
space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
54. Pacheco v. City of New York, 11 Misc. 2d 80, 140 N.Y.S.2d 275, (Sup. Ct.
Bronx County 1954), af'd, 285 A.D. 1031, 140 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1st Dep't 1955). See
also 57 AM. JuH. 2d, supra note 20, § 254.
55. Gambling v. Cornish, 426 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (N.D.Ill. 1977). (alleged
intentional torts of false arrest, false imprisonment and sexual assault are not within
the scope of police officer's employment).
56. Dzing v. City of Chicago, 84 111. App. 3d 704, 406 N.E.2d 121 (1980) (city
not liable for plaintiff's injuries resulting from off-duty police officer shooting his way
into plaintiff's apartment). See also Pacheco v. City of New York, 11 Misc. 2d 80, 140
N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1954) (plaintiff who joined willingly in the
peregrinations of an off-duty policeman on a drunken spree may not hold city liable),
aff'd, 285 A.D. 1031, 140 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1st Dep't 1955); Corridon v. City of
Bayonne, 129 N.J. Super. 393, 324 A.2d 42 (1974) (city may not be held liable under
respondeat superior theory when intoxicated police officer drew service revolver and
shot decedent during an apparently normal conversation).
57. Charles v. Town of Jeanerette, Inc., 234 So. 2d 794 (La. Ct. App. 1970). See
also Ellis v. Jordan, 571 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Sturman v. City of Golden
Beach, 355 So. 2d 453 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
58. Cheatham v. City of New Orleans, 368 So. 2d 146 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (shoeshine boy shouted obscenities at off-duty policeman who then proceeded to manhandle the boy; plaintiff intervened, fight broke out and policeman shot plaintiff).
59. Fitzgerald v. McCutcheon, 270 Pa. Super. 102, 410 A.2d 1270 (1979). After
getting into an argument with his neighbor, the intoxicated off-duty policeman shot
his neighbor six times with a gun that had not been issued or registered to him by the
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within the scope of police duties will not preclude a finding of liability
against the city,6 0 an intentional killing wholly unrelated to the performance of a police officer's official duties will. 1 Moreover, in jurisdictions where governmental immunity prevails, the plaintiff must
prove that the police officer was engaged in a proprietary function
when the injury occurred. 6 2 This is a difficult burden of proof because
police activities generally have been held to be governmental functions 63
Respondeat superior, therefore, has a limited application to cases
involving police shootings. For municipal liability to exist, the plaintiff must prove that the officer was acting within the scope of his
employment or in furtherance of the police department's interests at
the time of the shooting.
2. Municipal Negligence
A plaintiff injured by an intentional act of a police officer may seek
to recover from the police officer's employer, the municipality, by

police department. The court stated that the policeman's acts "were motivated by
reasons personal to himself and did not further the purpose of his employment as a
policeman." Moreover, the
act was so outrageous, so criminal, and so incapable of anticipation by his
employer, that it must be held as a matter of law to exceed the scope of
McCutcheon's employment. To hold a municipality liable for conduct of
an off duty policeman under the circumstances of this case on a theory of
respondeat superior would be unreasonable and would exceed the legitimate legal and social purposes which sustain the doctrine.
Id. at 107, 410 A.2d at 1272. See also Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce, 366 So. 2d 640
(La. Ct. App. 1978) (killing by police officer resulting from a long standing personal
vendetta); Snell v. Murray, 117 N.J. Super. 268, 284 A.2d 381 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1971), af'd, 121 N.J. Super. 215, 296 A.2d 538 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972) (city not
liable for bullet wound since police officer was furthering his own illegal ends by
extorting proceeds of dice-game). A premeditated murder committed by a police
officer has been held to be outside the scope of employment as a matter of law.
Kyreacos v. Smith, 89 Wash. 2d 425, 429-30, 572 P.2d 723, 725 (1977). The police
officer had previously been convicted of premeditated murder and the court reasoned
that it would be illogical to permit a civil jury to conclude otherwise. Id.
60. Burns v. City of New York, 6 A.D.2d 30, 174 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1958)
(plaintiff shot by off-duty policeman engaged in search for narcotics law violators);
Shipley v. City of South Bend, 372 N.E.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1978) (reasonable, deliberate use of deadly force by police officer does not constitute assault and battery).
61. Garcia v. City of, New York, 87 A.D.2d 643, 448 N.Y.S.2d 747 (2d Dep't
1982).
62. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.65.
63. Bartashevich v. City of Portland, 308 A.2d 551 (1973). See also notes 24-25
supra and accompanying text.
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alleging negligence 64 on the part of the municipality.6 5 The municipality's negligence derives from two theories: (1) negligent hiring or
retention; or (2) inadequate training. Under the municipal negligence
theory, the focus is on the negligence of the municipality through its
police department, rather than on the imputed negligence of the
officer. Thus, the city is held directly liable for the wrongful act in
contrast with the vicarious liability imposed under respondeat superior.6 1 Therefore, liability may be imposed under a negligence theory
in situations where the respondeat superior doctrine precludes liability
by its "scope of employment" requirement.
a. Negligent Hiring or Retention
Liability may be imposed upon a municipality under the theory of
negligent hiring or retention where a city has retained an officer
whose past history has or should have placed the municipality on
notice 7 of the officer's propensity for violence or instability.6 8 In such
cases, the officer's continued employment creates a risk of bodily harm
69
to others which the city should anticipate and is obliged to abate.

64. A cause of action for negligence requires proof of:
1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law, requiring the actor to
conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protection of others
against unreasonable risks.
2. A failure on his part to conform to the standard required....
3. A reasonable close causal connection between the conduct and the
resulting injury. This is what is commonly known as "legal cause" or
"proximate cause."
4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the interests of another....
W. PnossER, supra note 20, § 30, at 143.
65. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.16. The plaintiff must prove that it was
the negligence of the municipal corporation that was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries. The established rules of negligence generally are applied and the
existence of negligence on the part of the city is a question of fact for the jury. Id.
66. Fernelius v. Pierce, 22 Cal.2d 226, 233-34, 138 P.2d 12, 17 (1943) (city may
be liable for wrongful death of prisoner beaten by police officer).
67. Snell v. Murray, 117 N.J. Super. 268, 274, 284 A.2d 381, 385 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1971) (mere fact that the city entrusted the police officer with a pistol
would not impose liability unless the city had knowledge of a propensity towards
violent conduct), alf'd, 121 N.J. Super. 215, 296 A.2d 538 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1972). The necessary notice may be either actual or constructive notice. See McCrink
v. City of New York, 296 N.Y.99, 106, 71 N.E.2d 419, 422 (1947).
68. McCrink v. City of New York 296 N.Y. 99, 106, 71 N.E.2d 419, 422 (1947).
69. Id. at 103, 106, 71 N.E.2d at 420, 422. See City of Green Cove Springs v.
Donaldson, 348 F.2d 197, 201 (5th Cir. 1965) (it must be shown that this known risk,
and municipalitiy's failure to guard against it in retaining officer, was the proximate
cause of injury).
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Courts apply the negligent hiring or retention theory without regard
70
to whether an officer's act is within the scope of his employement.
To state a cause of action on a theory of negligent hiring or retention, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) an employment relationship
existed; (2) the employee was incompetent; (3) the employer had
actual or constructive knowledge of the employee's incompetence; (4)
the employee's negligence caused the plaintiff's injuries; and (5) the
employer's negligence in hiring or retaining the employee was the
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. 71 The city also must disclose
the police officer's personnel file so that previous misconduct by the
officer may be discovered.7 2
An action was brought under the negligent hiring or retention
theory in McCrink v. City of New York.73 McCrink involved a police
officer who, while off-duty and admittedly intoxicated, shot and
killed one person and seriously wounded another.74 ,The officer's assault was unprovoked. 75 The evidence included police records of several departmental disciplinary proceedings against the officer involving intoxication. 7 The New York Court of Appeals held the city
liable, noting that the police commissioner had testified "that a revolver in the hands of a drunken person is fraught with potential
' 77
danger.

70. MeCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. at 102-03, 71 N.E. 2d at 420.
71. Comment, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment: The Case Against
Exclusion, 52 OR. L. REv. 296, 298 (1973); 2 AM. Jun. PROOFS OF FAcTs 2D 614, 615.
See Note, The Responsibility of Employers for the Actions of Their Employees: The
Negligent Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 717 (1977). See also 2
AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 614, 616-18 for advantages of an action based on
negligence in hiring or retaining employees over one based on respondeat superior;
Comment, supra, for a discussion of pleading in the alternative the negligent hiring
theory and the respondeat theory. Some jurisdictions have held that the theories must
be stated separately. See, e.g., Tuite v. Union Pac. Stages, Inc., 204 Or. 565, 574-76,
284 P.2d 333, 337-38 (1955).
72. Watson v. Mix, 38 A.D.2d 779, 328 N.Y.S.2d 161 (4th Dep't 1972). Contra
City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. App. 3d
778, 786, 109 Cal. Rptr. 365, 370 (Ct. App. 1973) (need for confidentiality of police
personnel records outweighs need for disclosure to private litigants). The necessary
precipitous misconduct can have occurred either while on the police force, as was
true in McCrink, or prior to the police officer's employment. Peters v. Bellinger, 22
Ill. App. 2d 105, 159 N.E.2d 528 (1959) (city negligent for not checking record before
hiring where record would have indicated conviction of grand larceny and involvement in street brawls).
74. Id. at 102-03, 71 N.E.2d at 419-20.
75. Id. at 102, 71 N.E.2d at 419.
76. Id. at 104, 71 N.E.2d at 420-21.
77. Id. at 105, 71 N.E.2d at 421. See also Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d
770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (2d Dep't 1966) (although the city required plaintiff's husband
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The application of the negligent hiring or retention theory is unavailable in jurisdictions where governmental immunity prevails.
Courts in those jurisdictions have held that knowledge of prior misconduct or incompetence will not render the municipality liable, 7
even where a police officer is known to be "notoriously" incompe79
tent.
b. Inadequate Training
A municipality may be liable for an unjustified or negligent shooting by a police officer under the inadequate training theory if the
shooting is chargeable to a lack of training or experience. 80 To establish liability on the part of a municipality for inadequate training, a
plaintiff must prove all the elements of a negligence action: duty,
breach of duty, proximate cause, and injury. 8 ' The inadequate training theory applies to on-duty shootings as well as to off-duty shootings
where the police officer is required to be armed while off-duty. 82 As
with the negligent hiring or retention theory, an officer's actions
committed outside the scope of his employment may not preclude a
3
finding of liability against the municipality.

to surrender his service revolver, it did not divest him of his capacity to own and
possess a revolver). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 307 (1964) recognizes that if
an instrumentality (the police officer) is used which the actor (the municipality)
knows is incompetent and involves an unreasonable risk of harm to others, the actor
will be held negligent. See generally 18 MCQtIILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.78 ("the city
may not with impunity retain in service an employee from whose retention danger to
others reasonably may be anticipated").
78. Luvaul v. City of Eagle Pass, 408 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966);
Stouffer v. Morrison, 400 Pa. 497, 502, 162 A.2d 378, 381 (1960).
79. Mellhenny v. City of Wilmington, 127 N.C. 146, 37 S.E. 187 (1900) (city not
liable for plaintiff's injuries resulting from blow from police officer's club).
80. McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960). See notes 84-87
infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the case.
81. See note 74 supra. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Davis, 386 A.2d 1195,
1200-01 (D.C. 1978) (expert testimony concerning standard of care and proximate
cause required to support allegation of municipality's failure to provide adequate
firearm training).
82. Meistinsky v. City of New York, 285 A.D. 1153, 140 N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d Dep't
1955) (city liable for on-duty shooting), a]f'd mem., 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E.2d 900
(1956); Peer v. City of Newark, 71 N.J. Super. 12, 176 A.2d 249 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1961) (city liable for off-duty shooting where officer was ordered to carry his
revolver during off-duty hours).
83. Strachan v. Kitsap County, 27 Wash. App. 271, 277, 616 P.2d 1251, 1255
(1980) (although the officer's act was beyond the scope of his employment, whether it
was a proximate result of the county's alleged negligence in failing to require firearms
instruction was a question of fact).
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A cause of action based upon the inadequate training theory was
asserted in McAndrew v. Mularchuk.84 In McAndrew, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey held that a city may be liable for the injuries to a
plaintiff struck by a bullet fired by a reserve patrolman.8 5 The court,
warning that municipalities must take cognizance of the hazard of
requiring police officers to carry dangerous instruments and the ensuing risk to the public from that requirement, 6 held that municipalities
have a duty "to use care commensurate with the risk to see to it that
such persons are adequately trained or experienced in the proper
handling and use of the weapons they are to carry." 87
Subsequent decisions have refined and expanded the McAndrew
decision. In Peer v. City of Newark,8 8 the Superior Court of New
Jersey stressed that McAndrew should not be limited to cases where
there is a total lack of training, but also should include the issue of the
adequacy of the training. 89 McAndrew limited a municipality's liability to circumstances in which there was a negligent commission of an
act-permitting an inadequately trained police officer to go on duty.9 0
In Meistinsky v. City of New York, 9 1 the New York Court of Appeals
held that a municipality can be found negligent for its omissionfailing to adequately train a police officer in the use of small fire-

84. 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960).
85. Id. at 196, 162 A.2d at 833. The reserve partolman, who could be pressed
into service by the chief of police when needed, was required to carry a gun while on
duty, never questioned about his ability to use a gun, never given instruction in
handling or shooting the gun, and never given target practice. Id. at 176-77, 185, 162
A.2d at 823, 827.
86. Id. at 183-84, 162 A.2d at 826-27. See also Steward v. Borough of Magnolia,
134 N.J. Super. 312, 322-23, 340 A.2d 678, 684 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) ("[o]ur
courts have universally regarded loaded firearms as dangerous instruments and have
prescribed an elevated degree of reasonable care and caution to be exercised in their
use").
87. McAndrew, 33 N.J. at 184, 162 A.2d at 827. See also Sager v. City of
Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 298 (D. Colo. 1982) (risks created by a city's
failure to adequately train its police officers were unreasonable as a matter of law).
88. 71 N.J. Super. 12, 176 A.2d 249 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961). In Peer, while
an off-duty police officer was using toilet facilities, his service revolver discharged
and seriously injured the infant plaintiff in the adjoining apartment. The police
officer's training was alleged to be inadequate in that there was no adequate instruction on off-duty safety procedures, including the type of holster to be used and how
to carry the gun, nor was there any retraining program. Id. at 18, 176 A.2d at 252.
89. Id. at 24, 176 A.2d at 255.

90. 33 N.J. at 184, 162 A.2d at 827.
91. 285 A.D. 1153, 140 N.Y.S.2d 212 (2d Dep't 1955), af'd mem., 309 N.Y. 998,
132 N.E.2d 900 (1956).
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arms.912 It appears, however, that if an officer used his weapon for the
commission of a crime, the inadequate training theory would not
apply. 3 The officer's act would be an "unforeseeable superseding
intervening cause" which would break the causal chain and preclude
municipal liability.9 4 Moreover, in jurisdictions where governmental
immunity has not been abrogated, the inadequate training theory
may not be successful because police training is considered a govern5
mental function .
B.

42 U.S.C. Section 1983

In addition to state law tort causes of action,9 6 a plaintiff has a
federal remedy under 42 U.S.C. §198317 against a municipality for
damages resulting from police misconduct. In Monell v. Department
of Social Services,98 the Supreme Court established a new cause of
action 99 in federal civil rights litigation by finding municipal liability
92. Id.
93. See Snell v. Murray, 121 N.J. Super 215, 296 A.2d 538 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1972). Although there was no proof offered on the charge of inadequate training, the
court stated: "Obviously he knew and did not have to be told that his weapon was
not to be used for the commission of an armed robbery or extortion." Id. at 217, 296
A.2d at 539.
94. Sager v. City of Woodland Park, 543 F. Supp. 282, 298 (D. Colo. 1982).
95. See, e.g., Berger v. City of Berkley, 87 Mich. App. 361, 368, 275 NW.2d 2,
4 (1978) (no distinction made between cases where officer's actions were committed
while on routine police duty and cases where wrongful action took place during a
training exercise since both are governmental functions).
96. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) ("The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked.") rev'd in part on other grounds, Monell v. Dep't of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
97. The statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
98. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
99. In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities were subject to suit
under § 1983 and thereby expressly overruled its earlier decision in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961). Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. In Monroe, the Court had held that a
municipality was not a "person" under § 1983. 365 U.S. at 191. See generally
Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1979);
Seng, Municipal Liability for Police Misconduct, 51 Miss. L.J. 1 (1980); Smith,
"New Liability" of Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of New York, 6 TEX. S. L. REV.
111 (1981); Note, Monell & Owen In The Police Injury Context: Municipal Liability
Under Section 1983 Without SupervisorialFault, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 517 (1982).
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results from a formal
where a constitutional violation or deprivation
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policy
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Specifically, a plaintiff proceeding against a municipality under
section 1983 must establish two essential elements. First, that the
conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States' 0 1 and, second,
official policy, regulation,
that the deprivation was caused by 0an
2
custom, or usage of the municipality.1
The determination of the first element, whether a constitutional
deprivation has in fact occurred, is made on a case-by-case basis.' 0 3 In
police shooting cases, the alleged deprivation suffered by the plaintiff
is a deprivation of liberty or life without due process of law. 0 4 Yet,
not all injuries caused by police action will be cognizable under
section 1983. There are many individual rights which are protected by
the states rather than by the federal constitution, including the right
to be secure from harm to person, reputation and property. 0 Section
1983 is not a general tort statute and liability will be imposed only for
those rights secured by the constitution and laws of the United
States. 106

100. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
101. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980).
The Court observed that the first inquiry in any § 1983 suit is whether a deprivation
of a constitutional right has occurred. See also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979). "A negative answer to that question will dispose of the plaintiff's claim
without the Court ever reaching the issue of whether that challenged conduct was
under color of state law or constituted state action." CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST STATE
GOVERNMENT 411 (Shepard's/McGraw-Hill 1982).
102. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. See also Comment, Municipal Liability for Torts
Committed by Volunteer Anticrime Groups, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 595, 599-615
(1982) (thorough discussion of municipal liability under § 1983).
103. See, e.g., Roberts v. Marino, 656 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir. 1981); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607
(4th Cir. 1980).
104. Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff suffered
injuries when struck by police officer with nightstick). In Shillingjord, the court
stated: "The right to be free of state occasioned damage to a person's bodily integrity
is protected by the fourteenth amendment guarantee of due process." Id. See S.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION-A GUIDE TO §

1983, § 3.08

(1979). See also LaRocco v. City of New York, 468 F. Supp. 218, 219 (E.D.N.Y.
1979) (depriving plaintiff of his constitutional rights in violation of § 1983); Stengel
v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 439-40 (6th Cir. 1975) (for violations of the civil rights of
the plaintiffs to due process and equal protection of the laws); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 824 n.18 (2d Cir. 1977) (the determination of whether there has
been a constitutional deprivation was decided as a matter of law because the essential
facts were undisputed).
105. Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
106. Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 264 (5th Cir. 1981).
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In Monell, the Court held that to establish the second element of
constitutional deprivation, the plaintiff must show that a municipality's official or unofficial policy or custom caused the injury. 107 Under
the official policy or custom rationale, the injury must result from an
action that implements or executes an officially adopted or promulgated regulation, ordinance, policy statement or decision. 0 8 By contrast, under the unofficial policy or custom rationale, the injury may
result from an action taken pursuant to a governmental custom,
which is neither formally approved nor authorized by written law,
but is "so permanent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or
usage' with the force of law."1 09
In addition, Monell held that a municipality cannot be vicariously
liable under section 1983 on a respondeat superior theory." 0 Thus, a
municipality cannot be held vicariously liable under section 1983
solely because it employs a tortfeasor.
Section 1983 was relied upon by the plaintiff in LaRocco v. City of
New York. "' The United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York held that New York City was not liable" 2 under section
1983 for damages resulting from a shooting outside New York City by
an off-duty policeman. 113 The court reasoned that neither an official
or unofficial policy nor a custom of the city caused the alleged injury.

1 14

In LaRocco, the plaintiff asserted that the alleged constitutional
deprivation stemmed from the city's policy requiring police officers,
whether on- or off-duty, to carry weapons at all times and to inter-

107. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91.
108. Id. at 690.
109. Id. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68

(1970)).

110. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Monell's rejection of respondeat superior as a basis
for municipal liability has been criticized. See, e.g., Schnapper, supra note 99, at
215; Smith, supra note 99, at 121-29; Respondeat Superior Liability of Municipalities
for ConstitutionalTorts after Monell: New Remedies to Pursue?, 44 Mo. L. REV. 514

(1979).
111. 468 F. Supp. 218 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
112. Id. at 220. As Monell made clear, there must be conduct by the city that
subjects a person to a denial of a constitutional right. The municipality is to be liable
for its own wrongful action or perhaps knowing omission, distinct from the wrongful
actions of a municipal employee. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
113. Officer LaRocco shot and wounded the plaintiff during an arrest for unlawful operation of an automobile. 468 F. Supp. at 219.
114. Id. at 220.
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vene in disturbances of the peace.115 The court, relying on the incident's occurrence outside the city limits, stated that "[b]y no stretch of
the imagination" could the shooting "be viewed as implementing or
executing a policy statement or regulation officially adopted by the
city."'"" The police regulation required officers to carry guns at all
times within the city. Therefore, LaRocco was "not obliged to be
7
armed" at the time of the shooting."
The court also rejected the plaintiff's alternative reliance on the
unofficial policy or custom rationale of Monell." 8 The plaintiff had
argued that even if official city policy did not require police officers to
be armed while off-duty outside the city, the requirement was at least
customary." 9 The court, in rejecting this argument, stated that "it
was not [the] execution of the custom, but [the police officer's] possible abuse of the privilege, that inflicted the injury .
1.0
A victim of a police shooting also may seek to hold a police officer
individually liable under section 1983. 121 To prove individual liability,
a plaintiff must establish that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law and that the conduct
deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the
22
constitution or laws of the United States.1
Individual liability of a police officer under section 1983 was at
issue in Stengel v. Belcher. 2 3 The Sixth Circuit held that an off-duty,
out-of-uniform police officer was personally liable for his intervention
24
in a barroom brawl which resulted in his shooting several persons.1
The court found that this action was under color of state law. 2 5 The
court rejected the defendant's arguments that he was acting as a

115. Id. (citing New York City Police Department Patrol Guide, Section 105-1
("Equipment Firearms"). See note 140 supra.
116. LaRocco, 468 F. Supp. at 220.
117. Id.
118. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
119. LaRocco, 468 F. Supp. at 220.
120. Id. The court reasoned that "[t]o accept plaintiff's argument would be tantamount to holding the city vicariously liable for a tortious act of its employee, a result
the Supreme Court in Monell expressly declined to permit." Id. See note 110 supra
and accompanying text.
121. Layne v. Sampley, 627 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1980); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d
438 (6th Cir. 1975).
122. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
123. 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975).
124. Id. at 441.
125. Id. at 439-41.
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private citizen. 126 The court reasoned that although private acts of
police officers fall outside section 1983,127 the officer was acting under
color of law because he intervened "pursuant to a duty imposed by
police department regulations." 128 Finally, the court stated: "It is the
nature of the act performed, not the clothing of the actor or even the
status of being on duty, or off duty, which determines whether the
9
officer has acted under color of law."12
The foregoing cases illustrate that section 1983 may be relied upon
in two distinct causes of action. First, a plaintiff may bring an action
alleging municipal liability for injuries resulting from a police shooting. The plaintiff must prove that either an official or unofficial policy
or custom of the municipality caused the injury, resulting in a constitutional deprivation. Second, a plaintiff may bring an action alleging
an officer's individual liability. The plaintiff must then prove that at
the time of the constitutional deprivation, the officer was acting under
color of state law.

126. The defendant argued "that he was engaged in private social activity, was
out of uniform and off duty and never identified himself as a police officer." Id. at
441.
127. Id. (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)). In Screws, the Court
made a distinction between cases where a police officer is not authorized to act, but
nevertheless takes action, and where the officer is authorized, but exceeds the limits
of his authority:
They acted without authority only in the sense that they used excessive
force in making the arrest effective. It is clear that under "color" of law
means under "pretense" of law. Thus acts of officers in the ambit of their
personal pursuits are plainly excluded. Acts of officers who undertake to
perform their official duties are included whether they hew to the line of
their authority or overstep it. If, as suggested, the statute was designed to
embrace only action which the State in fact authorized, the words "under
color of any law" were hardly apt words to express the idea.
Id. at 111.
128. Stengel, 522 F.2d at 441.
129. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D. Pa. 1968)).
The Stengel court reasoned that because the defendant had intervened pursuant to
police department regulations imposing a continuing duty on police officers, and
because he had a gun and a can of chemical mace which he was required by police
regulations to carry at all times, he was acting at the time of the shooting under color
of state law as a matter of law. Stengel, 522 F.2d at 441. The court did concede,
however, that the police officer overstepped his bounds and used poor judgment. Id.
at 441-42.
The United States Supreme Court originally granted certiorari in Stengel. Belcher
v. Stengel, 425 U.S. 910 (1976). However, the Court dismissed the writ as improvidently granted because the question framed in the petition was not in the facts as
presented by the record then before the Court. Belcher v. Stengel, 429 U.S. 118
(1976). The question presented to the Court read:
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Bonsignore v. City of New York

The importance of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's recent
decision in Bonsignore v. City of New York 130 lies not only in its
expansion of the negligence theories of municipal liability,13 ' but also
in the court's treatment of the plaintiff's section 1983 claim.' 32 In
Bonsignore, the plaintiff brought an action against New York City
based upon two negligence theories, one similar to the hiring or
retention theory and the other to the inadequate training theory.' 33
Although a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 was rejected,' 34 the Second
Circuit affirmed a judgment against the city holding it liable for
personal injuries resulting from its negligent failure to adopt adequate
programs to detect police officers who are unfit to carry guns.' 35
On December 20, 1976, officer Blase Bonsignore, a twenty-three
year veteran of the New York City Police Department, 36 shot and

Does the fact that an off-duty police officer, out of uniform, is required by
police department regulation to carry a weapon at all times, establish that
any use of that weapon against the person of another, even though the
officer is engaged in private conduct at the time, [is] an act "under color of
law" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983?
Id. at 119 (emphasis added) (quoting question presented in the petition for certiorari). Chief Justice Burger explained in his concurring opinion that the Court had
originally granted certiorari because the question posed had limited the state action
to the requirement that the defendant wear a gun at all times; not that defendant
had intervened pursuant to a police regulation requiring such intervention. He
pointed to three contemporaneous factors, which in addition to possession of the gun,
colored the officer's conduct as official:
(1)The officer testified that he had formed an intention that he would
arrest at least two of the men when he stood up to intervene in the
altercation; (2) he intervened by using a can of mace issued to him by the
police department; (3) he was acting pursuant to a police regulation which
required his intervention in any disturbance of the peace, whether he was
on or off duty.
429 U.S. at 120. The Chief Justice emphasized that "it is unclear what the result
would have been had the only contemporaneous evidence of state action been the
presence of the state-required gun. Id. See also Layne v. Sampley, 627 F.2d 12 (6th
Cir. 1980) (police officer's actions held to be under color of state law based on
contemporaneous factors in addition to the authorization to carry a gun while offduty).
130. 521 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), afJ'd, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir. 1982).
131. See notes 177-85 infra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 186-89 infra and accompanying text.
133. See text accompanying note 147 infra and note 148 infra.
134. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638-39.
135. Id. at 638.
136. Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp at 396.
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seriously wounded his wife 137 and committed suicide by shooting
himself in the head with his .32 caliber "off-duty" revolver. 38 The
plaintiff, Bonsignore's wife, alleged that the City of New York was
negligent: (1) in requiring a potentially unfit 3 9 officer to carry a
gun, 40 and (2) in failing to adopt a program that would have identified the officer as unfit to carry a gun. 14' The plaintiff further alleged
caused her injuries 42 and her husband's
that the city's negligence
143
wrongful death.
The jury rejected the plaintiff's wrongful death claim against the
city 144 but awarded her compensatory and punitive damages based

137. Id. The plaintiff sustained brain damage and serious motor dysfunction as a
result of being struck by five bullets, several fragments of which remained in her
body. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id, at 399. Bonsignore had been assigned the position of precinct attendant or
"broom" which is classified as a limited-duty assignment and usually indicates a
mental or physical disability. Id. at 399. The district court refers to Bonsignore's
mental illness. Id. at 396. The Second Circuit's decision is premised on the fact that
Bonsignore was unfit to carry a gun. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638.
140. Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp at 396. On December 26, 1976, there was a requirement in effect that each New York City police officer carry his gun on person 24
hours, even when off-duty. See New York City Police Department Patrol Guide,
Section 105-1 ("Equipment Firearms") which states in part:
1. Be armed at all times when in the City of New York, unless otherwise
directed, with:
a. Service Revolver (See 105-4) or
b. Off duty revolver - Smith and Wesson or Colt double action calibre
.38 Special revolver, with a barrel at least two (2) inches in length,
military (Patridge) sights, blued parkerized finish and wooden stock.
There is no question that this requirement is of major significance to this case. For
cases in which this requirement was a factor, see McCrink v. City of New York, 296
N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947); Kull v. City of New York, 40 A.D.2d 829, 337
N.Y.S.2d 241 (2d Dep't), rev'd on dissenting opinion, 32 N.Y.2d 951, 300 N.E.2d
736, 347 N.Y.S. 2d 205 (1973); Burns v. City of New York, 6 A.D.2d 30, 174
N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1958); Collins v. City of New York, 11 Misc. 2d 76, 171
N.Y.S.2d 710 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958), aff'd mem., 8 A.D.2d 613, 185 N.Y.S.2d
740 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 7 N.Y. 2d 882, 164 N.E.2d 719, 196 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1959);
Hacker v. City of New York, 46 Misc. 2d 1003, 261 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1965), rev'd, 26 A.D.2d 400, 275 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't) 1966), aff'd, 20
N.Y.2d 722, 229 N.E.2d 613, 283 N.Y.S.2d 46 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1036
(1968).
141. Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp. at 398.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 396.
144. Id. On appeal, the city argued that the jury's verdict awarding damages on
the negligence claim but denying recovery on the wrongful death claim was so
inconsistent that the district court erred in denying their motion for judgment n.o.v.
or, in the alternative, a new trial. The Second Circuit stated: "This claim is without
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upon her personal injury claim. 145 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that a reasonable jury
could have concluded that the plan adopted by the city for screening
officers was unreasonable and that its negligence in adopting the plan
caused the plaintiff's injuries.

A.

46

The Negligence Issues

At trial, the evidence was submitted to the jury on two theories of
negligence under New York law: "whether 'under the circumstances
[the city] should have known that Mr. Bonsignore was dangerous and
should not have been permitted to carry a gun' or whether the city
had failed to 'adopt or implement a sufficiently effective program of
psychological screening and monitoring of police officers." 147 The jury
48
based its finding of negligence on the second ground.

merit. While the jury could have concluded that the City's failure to adopt a
reasonable program to screen violence-prone officers was the proximate cause of Mrs.
Bonsignore's injuries, the jury also could have concluded that Officer Bonsignore
would have committed suicide even if the City had identified him as a problem
officer and had removed his gun." Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638.
145. Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp. at 636. The plaintiff was awarded $300,000 in
compensatory damages and $125,000 in punitive damages. The plaintiff moved for a
new trial, claiming the compensatory damage award was inadequate. The district
court denied the motion, reasoning that the amount awarded was not so unreasonable as to justify setting aside the verdict.
The city moved for judgment notwithstanding verdict or alternatively for a new
trial, maintaining that the verdict was not supported by the evidence and was
unreasonable as a matter of law. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 636. The district court
pointed out that the city faced a difficult burden in seeking to set aside the jury's
verdict and stated that defendant undermined its position by offering "virtually no
defense at trial." Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp. at 396.
146. Id. at 397.
147. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 637.
148. Id. The jury was instructed that the city could be found liable on this ground
either if the city had failed to address the problem, or if it had adopted measures a
reasonable person could find deficient, but not "merely because the system that [the
city] chose seems insufficient or imperfect or because the jury would have chosen a
different system." This instruction was based on several New York decisions which
have held that when a jury reviews a determination of a governmental planning
board for tort liability, it should not substitute its own judgment for that of the
planning body; rather it should find liability only if there is proof that the plan was
the product of inadequate study or that it lacked any reasonable basis. Bonsignore,
521 F. Supp. at 397 (citing Weiss v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d 579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200
N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960) (action against city for injuries arising out of automobile accident allegedly caused by negligent design by city in the clearance interval between
changing of traffic lights); Southworth v. New York, 62 A.D.2d 731, 405 N.Y.S.2d
548 (4th Dep't 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 874, 392 N.E.2d 1254, 419 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1979)
(action against the state for injuries and death sustained as a result of accident
allegedly caused by the negligent establishment and operation of an experimental
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drivers' rehabilitation program); Santangelo v. State of New York, 103 Misc. 2d 578,
426 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (action against state for personal injuries sustained
when raped by prisoner released under temporary release program)).
The jury denied recovery on the first ground of negligence, that the city knew or
should have known that Bonsignore was dangerous and should not be permitted to
carry a gun. The district court stated: "This claim of negligence because of actual or
constructive knowledge of danger was the subject of substantial testimony at trial,
but the evidence (although unrebutted by defendant) was highly speculative and
circumstantial." Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp. at 398 n.l. This claim is similar in reasoning to the negligent hiring or retention theory of negligence.
149. Id. The EWS was established in April 1973 to identify problem officers, those
officers who were "marginal performers, violence prone, or evidenced some kind of
emotional problem." Record at A475, Bonsignore. The EWS was established in
reaction to the fatal shooting of a ten-year old black youth which resulted in community unrest and the dismissal of the officer involved. The Police Department discovered that the officer had been involved in prior similar situations in various parts of
the city. The Department determined that a central repository was needed to consolidate material which would alert the department to officers who might be violence
prone. The Violence Prone Task Force was created and given a mandate to detect
violence prone policemen thought to be a danger to themselves and the public. These
officers were to be reassigned from patrol to nonpatrol positions. The task force
conducted a nine-month intensive review of 30,832 personnel files, applying criteria
developed to detect personnel with personal problems, ranging from poor police
performance to violent and criminal acts. This "violence prone list" included the
following indicators: marriage and family difficulties, financial problems, drug or
alcohol addiction problems, psychopathology, socialization problems, training problems, and conflicts with supervisors. In addition, each commanding officer was
required to select five police officers under his command believed to have potential
behavioral problems or who were currently manifesting problems in their day-to-day
work. As a result of the task force review, and the determinations made by the
commanding officers, 474 officers were "flagged" as violent prone. One hundred of
these officers were removed from active patrol after being classified as presenting a
"high risk" potential for violence, 368 officers were reassigned to less stressful command assignments and only six officers were reassigned to positions where they were
not allowed to carry firearms. This marked the first attempt by the Police Department to develop a system of predictors for problem officers. The name of the
program was eventually changed to the Early Warning System, with the emphasis
changing from violence prone officers to tracking officers with emotional or behavioral problems. R. Zimmerman, Development of an Early Warning System Within
the New York City Police Department (February, 1978) (unpublished thesis) (available in John Jay College of Criminal Justice Library); Interview with Sgts. Gerard
W. Kelly and David W. Nadel, New York City Police Department, in New York City
(March 4, 1982); Record at A475-76, Bonsignore.
At the time of the Bonsignore shooting in 1976, the EWS staff examined information in the personnel files such as sick-leave records, complaints, recommendations,
transfer reports, and performance evaluations to detect problem officers. If a problem was detected, a colored dot was placed on the officer's file. Each color represented a different type of problem. The sergeant in charge of the centrally located
personnel files was responsible for notifying the commanding officers of any police
officer whose file had been flagged. Initially, however, it was the responsibility of the
commanding officer and first line supervisor at the precinct level to make sure that
the information was entered into the appropriate file. Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp. at
398; Nadel Interview, supra. See text accompanying notes 199-208 for a discussion of
the present program.
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The Second Circuit affirmed the verdict, stating that the jury could
have found that the Early Warning System ("EWS"),' 49 the city's
program to identify unfit officers, was ineffective 50° because it was
doomed by a "code of silence" existing among policemen.15 1 Moreover, the Second Circuit maintained that the EWS was operationally
defective as illustrated by its failure to "flag" Bonsignore.15 2 Noting
that the city had developed other screening programs, 1-3 the court
determined that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the
city was negligent either because the procedures involved were deficient, or because the city either abandoned or never fully implemented those programs.15 4 The Second Circuit noted that the city had

150. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 637. The court found that one reason that the EWS
was ineffective was that "the characteristics monitored by the use of colored dots
were never validated as reliable indicators of mental or emotional problems in police
officers." Id.
151. Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp at 398. The plaintiff offered evidence that the code
of silence, "an unwritten but compelling norm that a police officer shall not damage
a fellow officer in any.way," was an ethic impressed upon new recruits at the police
academy, that it extended to superior officers, and that top officials were familiar
with the code and had attempted to draft a new code of conduct that would make it
an ethical imperative for officers to report colleagues. In addition, one plaintiff's
witness "testified that police officers would be unlikely to report a fellow officer who
displayed the traits manifested by Bonsignore." Moreover, the testimony as to the
code of silence was unrebutted by the defendant. Id. at 398-99.
152. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 637. "Bonsignore was never identified as a problem
officer, despite his displaying many of the signs that should have flagged him as
having mental or emotional problems, such as excessive sick leave, incomplete performance reports, and assignment as the Nineteenth Precinct's attendant (or
"broom"), a limited-duty assignment, for thirteen years." Id.
153. One such program is the Psychological Services Unit (PSU). See notes 192-97
infra. The plaintiff established that like EWS, the PSU, though commendable on
paper, failed in practice because it did not take into account "peculiar institutional
mores" of the police department. The plaintiff's witnesses testified that there was
considerable stigma attached to seeking psychological help and that an officer's
career would be harmed by the stigma of going to PSU. Therefore, officers would not
readily seek psychological help voluntarily. Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp. at 399-400.
The district court stated that "the PSU could not be relied upon to lead to detection
and treatment of dangerous police officers" and "[t]he jury was therefore justified in
concluding that the Police Department acted negligently in the manner in which it
designed and operated the Psychological Services Unit." Id. at 400. The Second
Circuit, however, did not mention the PSU. Although the PSU was in existence in
1976, there was no requirement that incoming officers undergo any type of psychological examination as to their fitness to carry guns and otherwise perform their
duties when Bonsignore joined the Department in 1953. Bonsignore was never given
a psychological examination in the 23 years that he was on the force. Id. at 398.
154. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 637. The court acknowledged that the city offered
evidence that 1500 of the 25,240 Police Department members had been examined by
psychiatrists, psychologists, or alcoholism counselors in 1976. Of these, 800 officers
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offered no evidence that these programs, once implemented, were
reviewed or evaluated to determine whether they were serving their

intended purposes. 15 5 Therefore, the court held that the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's finding of negligence, as the measures
adopted were so deficient that no reasonable person could have accepted the city's judgment in adopting them.' 5 6
The Second Circuit also addressed the issue of proximate cause,
stating that the jury could have reasonably found that Mrs. Bon57
signore's injuries were proximately caused by the city's negligence.1
The court noted that proximate cause limits a defendant's liability to
"those foreseeable consequences that the defendant's negligence was a
substantial factor in producing." 5 The court held that it was foresee-

were subject to constant monitoring. The court, however, reasoned that this evidence
"did not preclude the jury from reasonably concluding that the city was negligent
because of deficient procedures in regard to identifying police officers who should not
carry weapons." Id.
155. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 637.
156. Id. The district court allowed that although the "City's defense was certainly
competent, and no miscarriage of justice occurred," because it offered "virtually no
defense of its programs," a one-sided and incomplete record may have resulted,
Therefore, the court believed that it would be improper to permit this decision to
serve as the basis for collateral estoppel against the city in future lawsuits. The court
suggested that perhaps the city could have presented evidence showing that although
their programs were ultimately unsuccessful, they "were not so deficient as to bespeak negligence on the part of the City." Since there is the possibility that other
evidence could be introduced at future trials, "the City should be free to relitigate
against other plaintiffs the adequacy of its psychological detection and treatment
programs." Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp. at 402 & n.3 (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979); Cerbone v. County of Westchester, 508 F. Supp
780, 785 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Schwartz v. Public Adm'r of County of Bronx, 24 N.Y.2d
65, 72, 246 N.E.2d 725, 730, 298 N.Y.S.2d 955, 961 (1969)).
157. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 637. The plaintiff was obliged to prove proximate
cause on both her claims, for assault and wrongful death. The jury found for the
plaintiff on the proximate cause issue relative to plaintiff's own personal injury claim.
The jury found that the city's negligence in allowing Bonsignore to continue as an
armed police officer, with a duty to maintain a gun in his possession 24 hours a day,
proximately caused the shooting of the plaintiff. The Second Circuit affirmed. Id.
Federal courts had previously ruled that such proximate causation may properly be
established. See, e.g., Wanca v. Penn Indus., Inc., 260 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1958)
(employer's failure to dismiss employee created a risk that a fight, which was forsee'able, would ensue and that given the human proclivities of workmen, there was a
likelihood that one of the two employees would resort to a dangerous instrument and
thereby injure an innocent bystander); Underwood v. United States, 356 F.2d 92 (5th
Cir. 1966) (negligently releasing to duty an airman who was nervous, depressed, and
emotionally upset as a result of marital difficulties was the proximate cause of the
shooting and death of his former wife).
158. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 637-38, (citing Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting
Corp., 51 N.Y;2d 308, 314-15, 414 N.E.2d 666, 670, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169 (1980)).
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able that requiring all police officers to be armed without conducting
adequate screening posed a risk to other policemen and to members of
the public. 51 9 The infliction of the injuries by Bonsignore's affirmative
act did not relieve the city of responsibility, because the intervening
act was a normal and foreseeable consequence of the city's negligence. 1 0 Moreover, the risk of the intervening act occurring was the
same risk that rendered the city negligent.'"' Therefore, because "both

See also W. PROSSER, supra note 20, §§ 41-45. " 'Proximate cause' . .. is merely the
limitation which the courts have placed upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his conduct." Id. at 236.
159. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638. The defendant did not have to foresee the
particular shooting of Mrs. Bonsignore in order for the plaintiff to recover; rather the
issue was whether or not the defendant could be charged with foreseeing the likelihood of harm generally as the result of maintaining Bonsignore in its employ and
requiring him to carry a gun 24 hours a day. Plaintiff-Appellee's Answering Brief,
Bonsignore, at 22, (citing Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 455, 460-61, 176
N.Y.S.2d 302, 306 (1958) (action to recover damages sustained by taxicab driver who
was shot without provocation by police officer who was off-duty, drunk and in
possession of a gun, and had been placed in the taxicab by uniformed policemen)).
See also Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d at 316-17, 414 N.E.2d at
671, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 170 ("That defendant could not anticipate the precise manner
of the accident or the exact extent of injuries, however, does not preclude liability as
a matter of law where the general risk and character of injuries are foreseeable."). In
Bonsignore, the court found that "the consequences of the City's negligence were
foreseeable within a degree of acceptability recognized in New York law." 683 F.2d
at 638 (citing Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314-15, 414
N.E.2d 666, 670, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166, 169 (1980); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50
N.Y.2d 507, 520-21, 407 N.E.2d 451, 459, 429 N.Y.S.2d 606, 614-15 (1980); Pagan
v. Goldberger, 51 A.D.2d 508, 382 N.Y.S.2d 549 (2d Dep't. 1976)). The court
further noted that the consequences did not approach the degree of attenuation
condemned in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638.
160. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638. The court stated that " '[w]here the acts of a
third person intervene between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, the
causal connection is not automatically severed. In such a case, liability turns upon
whether the intervening act is a normal and forseeable consequence of the situation
created by the defendant's negligence .... . " Id. (quoting Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d at 315, 414 N.E.2d at 670, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 169 (only
when the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in
the normal course of events, or independent of or so far removed from the defendant's conduct, will the act be superseding and therefore breach the causal connection)). See also Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d at 520-21, 407 N.E.2d at
459, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 614; W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 44, at 271-72; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 448-449 (1965).
161. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638 (quoting Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.,
51 N.Y.2d at 316, 414 N.E.2d at 671, 434 N.Y.S.,2d at 170 (jury could find that risk
created by contractor was the injury of a worker by a car entering the improperly
protected work area and, therefore, the driver's negligent failure to take medication
which caused him to lose control of his car was not a superseding cause)).
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the type of harm that occurred and the person on whom the injury
was inflicted were foreseeable,"'' 2 the court found that "[t]he City
could reasonably have anticipated that its negligence in failing to
identify officers who were unfit to carry guns would result in an unfit
6 3
officer injuring someone using the gun he was required to carry."
B.

The Punitive Damages Issue

The Second Circuit rejected the city's argument that the jury's
punitive damage award was improper. 6 4 At the time of the decision, 165 New York law on municipal liability for punitive damages was
unclear. 6 1 The court declined "to anticipate the ultimate resolution of

162. The district court noted that the "[p]laintiff amply demonstrated at trial the
hazards of allowing unstable police officers to carry firearms" by showing that
between 1973 and 1976, 33 officers were killed either by criminals, suicide, or by
fellow officers, all with guns. 521 F. Supp. at 398. In addition, "the jury heard
evidence that police officers are especially likely to suffer from emotional problems
leading to violent behavior." Id. at 401. See notes 1 & 2 supra and accompanying
text.
The court stated that "it was reasonably forseeable that such an officer would
injure a member of his own family." 683 F.2d at 638. The jury heard evidence that a
person with a disorder such as suffered by Bonsignore was more likely to commit
spousal homicide if he possessed firearms. In addition, the psychodynamics involved
in using a gun (as opposed to some other instrumentality) to commit an act of
violence were detailed. Record at A612, 625-27, Bonsignore. See note 4 supra.
163. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638.
164. Id. The district court, in denying defendant's motion to set aside the punitive
damages award of $125,000, determined that the defendant did not object to the
punitive damages jury instructions at trial, that "[t]he jury could reasonably have
found that the City's efforts to deal with police violence were so inadequate as to
constitute gross and wanton negligence," and that such an award "was necessary as a
deterrent, to prod the (Police) Department into adopting meaningful measures to
prevent the recurrence of tragedies like this one." Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp. at 402.
Moreover, the court reasoned that the amount awarded was not excessive given that
it was less than half of the compensatory damage award and considered it a "moderate but firm expression of the seriousness with which the jury regarded the insufficiency of defendant's efforts to deal with a persistent but readily manageable problem." Id. at 402-03.
165. The decision was handed down on June 15, 1982. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at
635.
166. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638, comparing Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 82
A.D.2d 350, 441 N.Y.S.2d 275 (2d Dep't 1981), af'd, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 437 N.E.2d
1104, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1982) (punitive damages are not available against a municipality), cited with approval in LaBelle v. County of St. Lawrence, 85 A.D.2d 759,
445 N.Y.S.2d 275 (3d Dep't 1981) with Bevilaqua v. City of Niagara Falls, 66 A.D.2d
988, 411 N.Y.S.2d 779 (4th Dep't 1978) (assuming that New York law allows punitive
damages against a municipality).
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this issue," emphasizing the city's failure to object to the jury instruc16 7
tion on punitive damages.
Two days after Bonsignore was decided, 168 the New York Court of
Appeals resolved the punitive damages issue in Sharapatav. Town of
Islip,' 9 holding that the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in
the Court of Claims Act 70 does not permit punitive damages to be
assessed against the state or its political subdivisions.' 7 ' The Court of

167. 683 F.2d at 638 (citing FED. R. Civ. P.51, which provides in part: "No party
may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects
thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the grounds of his objection.").
168. The decision in Sharapata v. Town of Islip was handed down on June 17,
1982. 56 N.Y.2d 332, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1982).
169. 56 N.Y.2d 332, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347 (1982) (negligence action
brought by infant plaintiff to recover damages for injuries sustained on allegedly
defective slide equipment located ina public park maintained by defendant town).
170. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). See notes 30-34 supra and accompanying text.
171. Sharapata, 56 N.Y.2d at 334, 437 N.E.2d at 1105, 452 N.Y.2d at 348. See
Sharapata, 82 A.D.2d 350, 355-62, 441 N.Y.S.2d 275, 277-82 (2d Dep't 1981) for a
comprehensive review of New York case law on the subject, depicting either that the
Court of Appeals had refused to make any definitive statement on the issue as to
whether the nature or status of the defendant as a municipal corporation of itself
affected the right of a plaintiff to recover punitive damages, or that the New York
courts have instead relied upon the particular circumstances involved to settle the
issue.
InSharapata, the court analyzed the purposes of and the justifications for punitive
damages as contrasted with compensatory damages and examined the legislative
intent in waiving the State's immunity. Sharapata, 56 N.Y.2d at 335-39, 437 N.E. at
1105-08, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 348-51. The court explained that unlike compensatory
damages, punitive damages are assessed to punish the wrongdoer rather than to
restore the victim. In addition, the award of such damages is meant to deter repetition of the tortious conduct by both the defendant and others who might be tempted
to imitate his conduct. Sharapata, 56 N.Y.2d at 335, 437 N.E.2d at 1105, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 348. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1979); W. PROSSEa,
supra note 20, § 2, at 9. Moreover, punitive damages "may only be awarded for
exceptional misconduct which transgresses mere negligence, as when the wrongdoer
has acted 'maliciously, wantonly, or with a recklessness that betokens an improper
motive or vindictiveness' or has engaged in 'outrageous or oppressive intentional
misconduct' or with 'reckless or wanton disregard of safety or rights.' " Sharapata56
N.Y.2d at 335, 437 N.E.2d at 1106, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 349, citing, Morris, Punitive
Damages in PersonalInjury Cases, 21 OHIo ST. L.J. 216 (1960). The twin justifications for punitive damages are punishment and deterrence. The Sharapata court
reasoned that these justifications are not advanced when applied to a governmental
unit. The group for whose protection such damages were purportedly awarded, the
citizens and taxpayers, would be the identical group who would bear the burden of
the award. Sharapata, 56 N.Y.2d at 338-39, 437 N.E.2d at 1107, 452 N.Y.S.2d at
350.

1030

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XI

Appeals' holding is in accord with the rule recognized by a majority of
jurisdictions that, absent statutory authority, exemplary or punitive

damages may not be recovered against a municipality. 72 Although
Mrs. Bonsignore's punitive damage claim was successful, it is doubtful
whether plaintiffs in New York will be able to recover punitive damages from a city in the future.
C.

42 U.S.C. Section 1983

The Second Circuit held that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was
unavailable to the plaintiff.17 3 The court, emphasizing that Bonsignore was off-duty, reasoned that the officer was not acting under
color of state law when he shot his wife because his actions were

outside the scope of his duties as a police officer. 7 4 Rather, the court

determined that the shooting was within the ambit of Bonsignore's
personal pursuits. 75 The court appears to have addressed only the
"under color of law" theory of a section 1983 claim. The court failed
to address the issue of whether the requirement that Bonsignore carry
a gun at all times could have been considered under the custom and
usage theory of municipal liability pursuant to the Monell court's

construction of § 1983.176

172. See generally 18 MCQUILLIN, supra note 20, § 53.18a. See also Annot., 1
A.L.R. 4th 448; 57 AM. Jun. 2d, supra note 20, §§ 318-322; 63 C.J.S. Municipal
Corporations§ 495 (1949). For an example of the minority view, see Young v. City of
Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1978) (rejecting the various policy reasons for
denying punitive damages against a municipality, the court held that under proper
circumstances, punitive damages were recoverable in tort claim actions against
governmental subdivisions).
173. The district court denied plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to include a § 1983 claim, plaintiff cross-appealed from the denial, and the Second
Circuit affirmed. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 638.
174. Id. at 639 (citing Johnson v. Hackett, 284 F. Supp. 933, 937 (E.D. Pa.
1968)). Johnson, a pre-Monell decision which discussed whether police actions were
under "color of law," held that name calling and offering to fight are not acts which
are committed in the performance of any actual or pretended duty of a policeman.
The court stated "[i]t is the nature of the act performed, not the clothing of the actor
or even the status of being on duty, or off duty, which determines whether the officer
has acted under color of law." Johnson, 284 F. Supp. at 937.
175. Bonsignore, 683 F.2d at 639 (citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111
(1945) (plurality opinion) for the proposition that acts of police officers within the
ambit of their personal pursuits are not "under color of state law").
176. See notes 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
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The Effect of Bonsignore

Prior to Bonsignore, an attempted homicide 17 7 by a police officer
would have precluded a finding of municipal liability under the theories of respondeat superior, 1 78 municipal negligence, 171 or under 42
U.S.C. §1983.180 In Bonsignore, however, the city was found liable
for its negligence in adopting inadequate screening methods to detect
unfit policemen, despite the fact that the plaintiff's injuries were
inflicted by an affirmative act of the officer.' 8' Thus, Bonsignore
expanded the theory of municipal liability.
Under the negligent hiring or retention theory, the proximate cause
requirement was an impediment to recovery. 82 Although the city may
have been negligent in hiring or retaining a police officer it knew or
should have known was unfit, 8 3 liability was precluded because the
injury resulted from an intervening act. The Bonsignore court, announcing an expansive interpretation of proximate cause, held that
the officer's act was a normal and foreseeable consequence of the city's
negligence in requiring Bonsignore to be armed at all times without
84
conducting adequate screening procedures.
In addition, Bonsignore may have expanded municipal liability
based on the inadequate training theory. Previously, the absence of
proximate cause prevented recovery under this theory because the use
of a police officer's weapon for the commission of a crime was an
intervening act which precluded a finding of municipal liability for
inadequate training. 8 5 Bonsignore's expanded analysis of proximate
cause may be applied to inadequate training programs by arguing
that an attempted homicide is a foreseeable consequence of requiring
police officers to carry dangerous weapons without adequate training.
The Bonsignore court precluded the plaintiff from bringing a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.186 The court reasoned that the officer was not
177. N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1976, at 26, col. 2 (account of Bonsignore shooting).
178. See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
180. See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 160-63 supra and accompanying text.
182. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
183. The hiring or retention theory requires that the city have had notice that the
police officer was unstable and that his retention involved a known risk of bodily
harm to others. In Bonsignore, the city was not held liable because it should have
known that Bonsignore was unfit, but because the programs developed to give that
precise knowledge were so deficient. See notes 147-56 supra and accompanying text.
184. See notes 157-63 supra.
185. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text.
186. See note 173 supra.
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acting under color of state law, but was acting solely within the ambit
of his personal pursuits. 87 The court's analysis, however, is based
upon cases which analyze individual liability under section 1983,
rather than municipal liability under that statute.' 8 8 In a case similar
to Bonsignore, it should not be necessary to analyze an officer's tortious act under a color of state law theory, because it is the city's
negligence which is at issue. The city's gun requirement should enable
a plaintiff to bring a cause of action based on municipal liability
under section 1983. As in LaRocco, the constitutional deprivation
stemmed from the city's policy, regulation or custom requiring its
18
police officers to carry firearms at all times.
Following Bonsignore, courts may be more willing to hold municipalities liable for a plaintiff's injuries resulting from a shooting by an
unfit officer. Thus, Bonsignore illustrates the need for municipalities
to adopt adequate screening and monitoring procedures to identify
unfit police officers.
VI.

A Proposal for a Model Program

Municipalities must develop programs to detect, at the precinct
level, potential problem officers who are unfit to carry firearms. It is
essential that problem officers be identified and evaluated before
dangerous and fatal incidents occur. A program should serve two
purposes. First, it must act as a screening device to detect candidates
who are unfit to become officers. Second, it must continue to monitor
the fitness of all officers during their tenure with a police department.
A model program would be comprised of several distinct components. First, periodic psychological testing should be administered to
all members of the police department. Psychological tests are available which follow established criteria to predict how individuals will
react in given stress situations. 90 Since "a person's psychological
makeup predisposes that person to react in a certain way under given
circumstances,"''
it is mandatory that police departments use psychological tests and procedures to detect officers who have personality
disorders or are otherwise emotionally unsuitable for police work. In

187. See notes 174-75 supra and accompanying text.
188. The issue of individual liability is distinct from the issue of municipal liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See notes 96-129 supra and accompanying text.
189. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
190. G.BENNETT-SANDLER, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 248 (1979).
191. Id.
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addition to psychological testing of all new recruits for the purposes of
screening and selection, police departments should periodically administer psychological tests to all active members of the department.
New York's Psychological Services Unit (PSU) 192 is an example of a
program which administers psychological tests. PSU presently uses
9 4
Some candifive personality tests 193 to evaluate police candidates.
dates are rejected after testing, while others are marked "guarded"
and for their
and are monitored during their Police Academy training
9 5
field.
the
in
period
probationary
entire one year
PSU may be criticized, however, on several grounds. First, PSU
fails to monitor officers beyond their probationary period.196 Second,
the use of PSU by more senior officers is principally voluntary unless
an officer is required to participate by virtue of a command decision.
Moreover, the combination of several factors, including the location
of the PSU in the Police Academy, police officers' mistrust and scorn

192. The PSU was established in 1973 to serve three functions: (1) to administer
psychological tests to police officers upon entering the Police Department; (2) to
provide short term limited counseling to those officers experiencing emotional problems; and (3) to refer officers with more serious problems for long term counseling
outside the department. Record at A477, Bonsignore.
193. These tests include the Cornell Index, a modified version of the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory, the House Tree Person Test, the Detroit Police
Test, and the Rorschach Test. The results of these tests are analyzed to see if the
candidate falls within the norms. In addition, interviews are conducted and three
department psychologists review the material. Carroll Interview, supra note 7. The
concept of administering psychological examinations to candidates to determine
whether a particular candidate is qualified for police work is not new. It was first
proposed in 1917. Murphy, Current Practicesin the Use of Psychological Testing by
Police Agencies, 63 J. CRiM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 570 (1972). There are
approximately 36 different personality tests being used in police selection around the
country. The tests are standardized and produce numerical scores by use of an
answer key. The score is then compared to a "norm," an average score made
previously by a like group. Further professional interpretation is then usually needed.
Crosby, The Psychological Examination in Police Selection, 7 J. POLICE Sci. &
ADMIN.

215, 218 (1979).

194. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court held
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not preclude the use of testing or measuring
procedures for employment purposes, but it proscribes "giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstratably a reasonable measure of
job performance." Id. at 436. In Griggs, black employees challenged requirement of
a high school diploma or passing of intelligence test as a condition of employment.
Id. at 424.
195. The probation period has been increased from six months to one year. The
police department believes that the longer monitoring period, during which the
psychological adjustment to working in the police department is observed, improves
the likelihood of detecting unfit officers. Carroll Interview, supra note 7.
196. Id.
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of psychiatrists, and the stigma attached to emotional illness, serves to
discourage potentially unfit officers from seeking psychological treat97
ment and further discourages others from recommending it.1
To be effective, a psychological testing program must be administered on a periodic basis. Testing should not be restricted to those
officers who have manifested emotional or psychological disorders.
Periodic evaluations of officer candidates and current personnel are
necessary for the maximum assurance that unfit officers will be detected at the earliest possible stage.""'
Second, a model system should include an Early Intervention Program (EIP) established in conjunction with regular psychological testing. New York City has an EIP which may form the basis of a
model.""9 Under such a program, a confidential file containing negative personnel records is maintained for each officer.20 ° A simple
review of the files enables appropriate police department personnel to
monitor a potentially unfit officer.
There are two major sources of information feeding the EIP. The
first, the Central Personnel Index (CPI), is the repository for negative
personnel records. This repository contains records of: chronic or
excessive sick leave, Civilian Review Board complaints, comments of
superior officers, line of duty injuries, firearm discharges, 0 letters of

197. Bonsignore, 521 F. Supp. 394, 396. This opinion is supported by the executive officer of the New York City Police Department's PSU who stated recently that
the PSU was underused. Approximately 50 officers seek help from the unit annually.
In addition to the "stigma associated with any kind of emotional disturbance," the
officers "feel they are under the scrutiny of other officers" because the PSU is located
in the Police Academy. N.Y. Times, October 10, 1982, at 56, col. 1.
198. In Bonsignore, an expert witness testified that an individual suffering a
mental disorder and deterioration such as Bonsignore's would, with reasonable psychological certainty, have demonstrated behavioral changes to those he came in daily
contact with at work. Record at A627, Bonsignore. The New York City Police
Department, however, offers a contrary view. The department maintains that mandatory across the board testing would undermine morale, be too costly, would meet
with union resistance, and possibly encroach upon first amendment freedoms. The
Department questions the utility of periodic testing prior to any indications of
behavioral problems. Carroll Interview, supra note 7.
199. For a discussion of New York City's EIP, see G. Kelly and D. Nadel, The
New York City Police Department's Early Intervention Program: A History and
Outline of Functions (New York City Police Department Memorandum 1982) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
200. Id. at 2.
201. The Firearms Discharge Review Board was established in 1972 to review all
incidents involving the discharge of a firearm by any member of the force whether
on- or off-duty. New York City Police Department, Memorandum to All Commands,
August 18, 1972.
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criticism, negative transfers, civil suits, disciplinary actions, below
standard annual performance evaluations, 202 off-duty employment,
internal investigations (corrupt activity), salary garnishments, and
abusive use of force. 20 3 The police department's various agencies,
bureaus, and units are required to submit new information to the
CPI. 20 4 Any new material entered into an individual's file mandates
an evaluation of the entire file. If an individual is deemed to be20 a5
potential personnel concern the case is referred to an EIP counselor.
Any doubt as to the need for such a referral is resolved in favor of it.
The EIP determines whether to: refer the individual police officer to
PSU, another department counselling service, or an appropriate outside agency; transfer the individual to other duty; or continue EIP
20 6
monitoring.
The second source of information feeding the EIP is the Field
Resources System. 20 7 Under this system, EIP investigators frequently
visit all commands to elicit information directly from supervisors and
peers concerning potentially unfit officers. 20 8 On the basis of information received, the investigators may refer officers to PSU or other
psychological or counselling programs.
202. The first line supervisor (sergeant) was responsible for evaluating the performance of each police officer in his group twice a year. A specific evaluation form
was provided for the supervisors, in addition to an evaluation guide provided by the
department which contained sets of questions to be answered by the evaluator in
rating the officer on each of the criteria. One criterion, labeled "stability-flexibility,"
was directly related to the officer's capacity for stress and violence. The focus of the
questions for this criterion, however, was on the officer out on the street, not on a
limited duty assignment. A below standard evaluation was reported to the Central
Personnel Index. Record at A495, A504-06, Bonsignore.
203. Memorandum, supra note 199, at 2-3. In addition, a loss of a shield, identification card or gun requires a notice to CPI for inclusion in an individual's file, as does
a report of any "unusual occurrence on or off duty." Id.
204. Nadel Interview, supra note 149. See also Memorandum, supra note 199, at
2-3.
205. The staff of the EPI consists of two sergeants and one commanding officer.
One sergeant serves as the staff psychotherapist/counselor and the other as an investigator/counselor. Memorandum, supra note 199, at 6-7.
206. Id. at 3-4.
207. Id. at 2.
208. Id. at 4. EIP investigators educate supervisors and peers as to what constitutes a "personnel concern" and to emphasize the nonpunitive, treatment function of
the EIP. The educational aspect of the field visits was established to try to break
down the "code of silence." Id. at 4-5. See note 151 supra for a discussion of the code
of silence. The Department believes that this direct referral information is more
accurate than CPI referrals. Memorandum, supra note 199 at 4, citing a 58%
unfounded rate for CPI referrals, and a 24 % unfounded rate for peer and supervisory
referrals. Caution is urged. For example, on October 16, 1973, a letter was sent from
the Police Department medical section to Bonsignore's commanding officer concerning Bonsignore's sick record, a factor that was to be flagged by the EWS. The
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Additionally, positions should be categorized according to whether
they require that a firearm be carried at all times, only while on active
duty, or not at all. Equally important is the assignment of unfit
officers to those positions in which a gun would never be required.
In 1978, the New York City Police Department's requirement for
carrying guns while off-duty became discretionary in certain situations. 20 9 These situations include: (1) where possession of the firearm
would unnecessarily create a risk of loss of the firearm, such as during
sporting activities; (2) while the officer is on vacation; (3) while the
officer is engaged in authorized off-duty employment; or (4) while the
officer is engaged in any activity in which it would not be advisable to
2 10
carry a firearm.
Other municipalities should follow New York's example of removing the requirement that police officers carry guns at all times. Regulations should remove the gun requirement for certain departmental
positions to which unfit officers could then be assigned. Non-patrol
positions should be so classified. 2 11 An example of such a position is the
medical section recommended that an interview with Bonsignore might disclose a
serious disorder or underlying problem. There was no follow-up to this communication by the commanding officer. Record at A482, Bonsignore. It is suggested that it
would be better to rely on more objective procedures by which the medical section
, would report this information directly to the CPI. The CPI, in turn, would alert the
EIP, rather than rely on the more subjective nature of a direct referral from the
commanding officer to an EIP investigator on a field visit. Given the code of silence,
the more objective the system is, the more effective it will be in detecting unfit police
officers.
209. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT PATROL GUIDE, Section 105-1 ("Equipment Firearms").
210. Id. Effective 5/15/81, this regulation now reads:
1. Be armed at all times when in City of New York, unless otherwise
directed, or except as provided in item number 2 below, with:
a. Service revolver, OR
b. Off duty revolver-Smith and Wesson, Ruger, or Colt double
action calibre .38 Special revolver, with a barrel at least two (2)
inches in length, military (Patridge) sights, blued parkerized finish and wooden stock.
2. Be unarmed at own discretion while off-duty when:
a. Possession of the firearm, under the circumstances, would unnecessarily create a risk of loss or theft of firearm. Circumstances
may include sporting activities, attendance at beaches and pools,
etc., OR
b. On vacation, OR
c. Engaged in authorized off-duty employment, OR
d. Engaged in any activity of a nature whereby it would be advisable
NOT to carry a firearm.
Id.
211. See Safer, supra note 3, at 575-79 (arguments pro and con on arming police
officers when off-duty).
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"broom" position held by Officer Bonsignore, which is similar to that
of a precinct attendant. 212 By placing an unfit officer in a position
where he would not be able to carry a gun, there is less risk that he
would be in a position to misuse that gun to injure himself or another.
There are other recommendations of equal importance. Mandatory
limitations should be placed on the length of time an unfit officer may
spend on restricted duty or in limited capacity positions before a
decision as to his further employment is reached.2 13 -High and low
hazard command assignments should be designated, with mandatory
time limitations placed upon an officer's assignment to a high hazard
and more stressful precinct.2 14 Psychological testing could be used
after the established time frame has elapsed to determine whether the
officer should continue in that assignment or be transferred. At any
time prior to that limitation, an officer should be allowed to transfer if
he believes it necessary for his own emotional stability.
Finally, a city should continually assess its screening and monitoring program. 21 5- It must maintain an awareness of programs adopted
216
by other cities and be cognizant of developments in the field.

212. See note 139 supra and accompanying text.
213. The New York City Police Department, in order to reduce less than full-duty
positions, has a six-month limitation on restricted duty. After six months, the officer
is either returned to full-duty or retired. For example, if an officer is on sick leave
continuously for a six-month period and there is a poor prognosis for return to duty,
an application for a disability pension must be filed. If an officer continues on sick
leave for one year, regardless of the prognosis for return to duty, an application for a
disability pension is processed. In addition, there is a 30-day limitation on limited
capacity positions. Upon expiration of 30 days, the officer is examined by a psychologist or psychiatrist or a physician. Two extensions of 30 days are possible, but after 90
days the officer is placed on restricted duty and this triggers a pension review. Carroll
Interview, supra note 7. See also New York City Police Department Administrative
Guide, "Chronic Absence Control Program" 318-18 (1980). In addition, the Health
Services Division constantly monitors sick leave, and chronic absence reports are sent
to CPI. But see note 152 supra. In 1976, New York did have a regulation requiring an
investigation of any police officer who had been assigned to limited-duty for more
than one year. The results of the investigation were to be reported to the Commissioner. Bonsignore was not investigated. 683 F.2d at 637.
214. New York currently has a voluntary program in which any officer may
request a transfer to a less stressful assignment but only after a period of two years has
elapsed and not prior to that time. Nadel Interview, supra note 149. See also
Zimmerman, supra note 149, for a discussion of the classification of commands into
hazard ratings and the effect of stress on police performance in high hazard positions.
215. In Bonsignore, the Second Circuit noted that there was no evidence that the
city reviewed and evaluated the adequacy of the programs that were implemented.
683 F.2d at 637.
216. In Bonsignore, the jury was not evaluating the city's program in a vacuum.
The plaintiff presented evidence concerning the widespread acknowledgment of the
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Conclusion

Shootings by police officers who are unfit to carry guns are unnecessary and tragic events for both the officer and the victim, who is often
the officer himself. As more shootings occur, the need for developing
programs to evaluate the psychological well-being of police officers
becomes increasingly apparent. It is only when adequate monitoring
procedures are developed and are scrupulously enforced that municipalities will reduce their liability for injuries resulting from unjustified, senseless and preventable acts of violence committed by unfit
police officers. Moreover, those upon whom we place the difficult
burden of protecting us deserve programs designed to protect and
preserve their physical and psychological well-being.
Pamela A. Keating

need for such measures prior to 1976. The jury evaluated evidence concerning
programs established by other cities of comparable size, the expected effectiveness,
costs, administrative burdens, and the actual results of such programs. The judge
informed the jury that they were to consider all this information, but cautioned that
they were not to "treat the City as having known in 1976 any information introduced
in this trial that was not shown to have been available to the City at that time."
Record at A861, Bonsignore.

